14th November 2009 9:00
By Chris Chapman
After four years of brutal conflict and with early Southern victories at Shiloh and Chancellorsville now but a faded memory, by early 1865 the Confederacy was staring into the bloody abyss of defeat in the American Civil War. The rate of desertion was roughly one hundred men a day, morale was low, weapons had no ammunition, troops went without food for up to three days and conscription had been extended to all 17-50 year old men. The strategic situation was also dire: Petersburg and Richmond were under siege by Grant and Meade with Sherman from the South and Sheridan from the Shenandoah providing tactical reinforcement. At home, the will to fight was waning and the economy had been spiralling out of control for almost a year. Indeed, the conflict did end in unconditional surrender for the Confederacy on 9th April 1865. Poor political leadership by Jefferson Davis undeniably contributed to the weakness and vulnerability of the Confederates by 1865, but the South’s parlous state cannot be attributed solely to the actions of one man, however pivotal. The same is true by pointing fingers at the Southern military command and General Lee’s failure to win a major and decisive victory- poor political and dubious military leadership must be regarded as one of several causal factors, intertwined with wider social, economic and military problems.
Davis’ leadership was indeed a factor leading to Southern weakness. His sparing use of his executive powers, partly due to his belief in ‘populist democracy,’ deprived the Confederacy of a strong and radical leader, unlike the ruthless Lincoln for the North. His quarrelsome personality was such that he found himself unable to work in harmony with his subordinates and constantly bickered with Stephens, his Vice President, and his Military High Command. This internal division was further exacerbated by Davis making erratic changes in the Cabinet and war department due to popular and factional pressure, a strategy that produced no firm base for decision-making. It was due to these factional distractions that Davis procrastinated on important decisions requiring immediate resolution, such as the issue of suspending habeas corpus. Whereas Lincoln suspended it within a week of its proposition, Davis never resolved the problem. Neither did Davis possess the personal attributes of a war leader; he was timid, weak, a poor communicator and devoid of the great charisma needed to deliver inspirational leadership. Further, once he had decided on a matter, such as the introduction of conscription, Davis pursued it down the chain of command, his inability to prioritise and delegate depriving him of the critical holistic overview needed by a Commander in Chief. The epitome of his leadership can be seen in his final act when, after surrender, Davis called for the South to commence a guerrilla warfare campaign but was ignored by his exhausted people. With such ineptness in office it seemed inevitable the South would lose.
However, placing the blame for Southern political weakness solely on the shoulders of Davis, however tempting, is not entirely correct as there were other political factors that contributed to Confederate weakness. The lack of a two-party system created a politically polarised mix of ideologically incompatible deputies, depriving Davis of a secure, united support base. Davis also lacked a political party to mobilise when he needed support, so had no safety net even if he had actually wanted to take the hard decisions. The lack of a proper state-federal system intensified the divisions and highlighted Davis’ lack of support. The vacuum of competence and experience at state level after secession led regional governments to become uncooperative and often opposed to any notion of centralisation, vital if the war effort was to be successful across such expansive territory and against such material odds. Indeed, Owsley states that the South “died of states rights”, that the benefit of the state was often put before loyalty to the nation. States rights had been a major factor leading to secession and it was upheld throughout the life of the Confederacy. Owsley concludes that this lack of cohesion doomed the South from the beginning- indeed his Governors Vance and Brown are good examples of such fractured relations. Vance and Brown, Governors of North Carolina and Georgia respectively, took states rights to the extremes of withholding men and equipment from the Confederate army. Vance retained uniforms and shoes for his state’s troops to protect property and land, whereas Brown exempted thousands of men from the draft by enrolling them into bogus state militia units. Such actions can only be symptomatic of political disintegration.
Clearly, one cannot consider the reasons for Confederate weakness without also directly examining the sphere of military operations, and it is this area that is the ultimate causal factor for Southern loss in the war- with a decisive military victory the South could have stood a good chance of forcing the North into a position of accommodation of the Confederacy, whereas without it the South was always doomed to die. With the obvious exception of the mercurial General Robert E. Lee, who executed great tactical victories at Chancellorsville, Fredricksburg and the Second Manassas, the Confederate High Command was as inept as it was fragmented. The level of incompetence and lack of General-level command ability left the military in tatters. For instance, Braxton Bragg, commander of the Army of the Tennessee, was not tactically astute, but was unable to recognise it and refused to adhere to any centralisation of strategy. General Johnston was a more able military commander, but bickered constantly with others. John Bell Hood not only abandoned Atlanta to Sherman in August 1864, but he also ordered suicidal attacks on Union positions at Franklin and Nashville in November and December respectively. Even the aforementioned shining light of the High Command, Lee, saw his legendary Army of Northern Virginia decimated in truly horrific fashion at Gettysburg on 1st July 1863. Pickett’s charge was an unmitigated disaster that was hugely significant to the outcome of both the battle and the conflict. Pickett’s failure forced Lee to retreat from the battlefield with his Army of North Virginia in tatters and, on a more profound level, practically guaranteed foreign non-intervention and shattered the aura of Lee’s infallibility; he never dared press the advantage again, yet was now ill-equipped for a defensive war. Lee also set out to win a decisive victory that would force the North to give up as he realised a war of attrition would favour the North. Although he and his able subordinate, Stonewall Jackson, scored a few tactical victories, as alluded to before, he never realised his aim of a decisive win. However, in defence of the Southern high command, the Generals were always undermined by Davis’ leadership since they were constantly at odds with him and his government. Generals Bragg and Johnston voiced their opinions and were subsequently removed from office. Furthermore, when the Union exerted unbearable pressure on Vicksburg, Davis reshuffled the High Command structure; he appointed Joe Johnston as commander of military operations, yet left Bragg in command of the Army of the Tennessee and Pemberton at Vicksburg. The resulting conflict of command left this vulnerable city as prey to Grant, which surrendered on 4th July 1863. Unperturbed, Davis sacked Bragg in April 1864, and reappointed Johnston. Four months later he had installed a new commander, John Bell Hood, whose disastrous, suicidal advances are documented above. Therefore, we can see that Davis’ meddling in the High Command had adverse effects on military matters.
Indeed, therefore, it is quite clear to see that the politicians, with Davis the most culpable, were far more influential in undermining the Southern position. Indeed, with such a precarious starting position, strong leaders and effective ‘closing ranks’ was necessary to ensure any form of coordinated attempt at fighting back, let alone winning the war. The military, although not blameless, were simply trying to do the best they could in extremely difficult circumstances, which were made worse by the political leadership of the South. Though Davis’ meddling was destructive to Southern resistance, political interference in military matters was by no means the preserve of the South alone. Lincoln changed commanders of the Army of the Potomac four times in 1862 and three times in 1863. Yet what saved the North’s blushes was the eventual formation of the best High Command: Grant in overall command, ably supported by four deputies in Sigel, Sheridan, Sherman and Meade, each with his specific orders and theatre of operations. Indeed, the South’s obvious political weakness was in stark contrast to the experience in the North. The Union utilised the system of government and their experienced civil service that had already been tried and tested. In addition, Lincoln appointed Chase in the Treasury and Seward as Secretary of State, both of whom excelled in their respective roles, enabling Lincoln to leave Congress in control of economic matters. Lincoln was also a far more decisive leader and one who could inspire his population into a belief that not only was victory attainable, but that their stand in the conflict was just and right. Therefore the fragmented political situation Davis had to operate within, coupled with his poor personal leadership and the experience of his adversaries, meant that from a political perspective the Confederacy was certainly very weak in comparison with the political bulwark that Lincoln had constructed, with himself as the lynichpin.
However, claiming that Southern defeat in the war was simply due to military or political matters overlooks the other areas of Confederate weakness, such as their poor social and economic situations. Indeed, the dire social impact of the conflict, in many ways the first ‘Total War’ of the modern era, was hugely influential in the Southern demise. First and foremost, the lack of supplies, food and military victories took its toll on Southern morale. This was illustrated by the popular uprising in May 1864, when more than 10,000 people demanded the South pursue peace after Sherman’s invasion of Georgia had caused over $200 million worth of damage. The loss of 40% of the male population was not only demoralising but had grave social consequences: women demanded a right to work and slaves, spurred on by the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, refused to work until better conditions and pay were secured. The revolutionary mood of the entire Southern social spectrum provided an unstable base from which to fight a war. Beringer’s theory questions the South’s will to fight at all and the social problems caused by the Union’s destructive tactics and desire to win at any cost to friend or foe, epitomised by Grant’s pursuit of ‘Unconditional Surrender’ and the scorched earth policy of Sherman. However, whilst it is unfair and insubstantial to blame civilian disenchantment for Southern weakness and eventual defeat, especially given the extent of the losses suffered and the fact that the North were considering peace in 1864 when they started suffering the losses the South had been absorbing since the start, the demoralising impact on the Home Front and the physical damage done to Southern land and supply lines, especially after Vicksburg, did, of course, contribute to the Confederacy’s surrender.
In keeping with the nature of a ‘total war’ in which the South was required to mobilise all of its resources merely to stay alive, economic weakness contributed significantly to the South’s defeat. The agrarian society of the South rendered it economically less diverse than the North, with only one twelfth of its industrial capability. What little industry it did posses was highly inefficient; in fact, Shelby Foote believes that the vast superiority of Northern industry allowed the North “[to fight] with one hand behind its back.” Furthermore, the Union’s “Anaconda Plan”, which combined naval blockade with the securing of trade sanctions, starved the South of any external economic aid. The Confederacy’s attempted blackmail of Britain and France through locally declared cotton embargoes ruined the South’s chances of capitalise on its only lucrative export. Once again relying on King Cotton, the South overestimated the leverage that cotton had- the alternative markets of Egypt and India provided the necessary cotton instead. Indeed, after the bloodbath after Antietam creek in 1862, the concerns of Southern military collapse bred fears of the conflict evolving into another Anglo-American war- this was underlined after the Northern victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg which sealed the fate of British military intervention from Canada. The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 also brought a moral aspect of slavery into consideration, and Palmerston’s government simply could not be seen to be willing to commit resources and men in support of a regime that continued to rely on slavery. Indeed, Palmerston’s insistence on splendid isolationism was a course that he was never really willing to shift for the Confederacy. As Britain was growing increasingly dependent on North American grain, the threat of a wheat famine would be catastrophic. On a similar theme-agriculture, being the South’s main economic dynamo, was ravaged by the conflict on Southern soil. Thus the Southern economy stagnated and the oppressive strains of conflict on an already fragile base led to Southern economic collapse after a prolonged period, illustrated by the 150% hyperinflation in Richmond by 1864. The decision to continue printing money while tripling taxation was a truly desperate move by the Confederate government. Therefore, from a significantly weaker starting point in 1861, the economy had spiralled into an uncontrollable decline by 1865, leaving the South acutely vulnerable to the advances of Grant and Sherman and unable to mobilise fresh resistance or equip its armies for a final decisive push.
In conclusion, the incompetence and indecisiveness of Davis in office, coupled with the absence of many of the personal attributes of great leaders, stands in stark comparison to his counterpart Abraham Lincoln and is a major factor in the downfall of the Confederacy. Although we should, of course, avoid a historical inevitability thesis, the role of the President must not be understated. Indeed, Potter suggests “if the Union and Confederacy had swapped Presidents, the South may have won.” The lack of a political infrastructure in the South worsened his political position, but it was not irreversible and Davis could not find a way to combat this domestic fragility. There is no doubt that economic and social factors also played a role in creating the weak Confederate position. A nation without a stable economy and an uncooperative population does not create a good basis for war. Even so, Davis should have anticipated the inevitable collapse of the economy in his handling of the war, and inspirational leadership would have bolstered morale enough to mask the social problems at home. However, Davis had the right to trust his Generals to execute their command correctly and their inability to do this left the Confederacy in a worse position than Davis’ ineptness alone could have done. Although not absolving Davis of any blame for his poor political leadership and interference in their High Command, the poor military commanders were the ultimate reason for Confederate defeat. With more commanders like Lee and Stonewall Jackson, the South would have stood a much better chance of inducing war weariness in the North and so vastly increasing the likelihood of retaining the integrity of the Confederate nation. However, the ability for the South to win the war at all is crucial in understanding the kind of strain that the Confederacy was put under- and although it is a topic that needs discussing in a different essay, the point must be made that neither the southern generals nor politicians were to blame for Confederate defeat, rather that a combination of economic, social, political and military factors combined to assure an already probable Northern victory.