14th November 2009 9:00
By Chris Chapman
Has democracy proved compatible with imperialism?
Answer with reference to at least two case studies.
In such a vast topic as examining the compatibility of democracy and imperialism we need to select two case studies that allow us not only to examine the interaction between democratic and imperialistic principles but also the practical compromise that both strains of thought are forced to come to. However, the overlapping issues of both imperialism and democracy, and the subsequent conflicts of interest need to be highlighted before we set such findings against the backdrop of our specific case studies. Indeed, such case studies need to underscore the basic issues of democratic-imperialistic interaction in a microcosm- and as such I intend to look at Joseph Chamberlain and Theodore Roosevelt, in the British and American perspectives respectively, in order to see firstly how suitable each is in fulfilling the role of democrat and imperialist, as well as seeing how they personally dealt with issues concerning democracy and imperialism.
Firstly, however, we need to clarify what democracy and imperialism are and how that is applicable in a practical context. Imperialism is considered the desire to extend the influence of one’s nation over the, primarily, economic and political machinations of other nations to the colonial powers’ benefit. Indeed, Hobson suggests that such a projection of power can justify direct military intervention as well as economic coercion, political pressure or simple colonisation to achieve the aim of spreading the direct and indirect influence of the imperial master. Indeed, Rees continues by saying that not only can imperialism be an excuse for a somewhat dubious exertion of power, rather is, by necessity, autocratic. The imposition of the will of a nation over another must have roots in autocratic principles merely by the fact that democracy has been quashed by the substitution of the government of the host nation by the colonial power’s own regime. The great example of this was the scramble for Africa. Indeed, as Shillington cites, Africa saw a transition from ‘informal imperialism’ of exerting influence through military and economic dominance to that of direct rule from London, Paris, Berlin and other European capitals. Shillington continues that Africa offered the perfect opportunity for European powers, especially Britain, to redress the increasingly dire Balance of Payments situation and ease the rabidly protectionist nature of the continental markets. Thus, during the Long Depression (1873-1896) Africa offered Europe an open market that could foster the kind of trade surplus that could help kick start the ailing European economies. Capital was often more profitably invested overseas- cheap labour, limited competition, and land rich in raw materials that were easy to extract made a greater return possible. Indeed, these raw materials formed the backbone of European consumerism and industrial development and the fact they were unavailable in mainland Europe provided another reason for piquing European interest in Africa. However, in recognising the importance and economic salvation that Africa could hold, each European power shifted colonial policy away from informal interest to direct intervention to protect assets that the colonial powers claimed as theirs. Such ‘protection’ required enforcing the will of the colonial power onto the local population. Arednt’s work the Origins of Totalitarianism raises the issue that such rapid expansion of national sovereignty on overseas territories could be damaging to the solidarity of the ‘nation state’ which should provide citizenship to its populations, as a basic facet of a functional democracy. Thus, the tension between the will to respect human rights of the colonised people, as they may be considered as citizens of the ‘nation state’, and the imperialist desire to cynically exploit populations deemed backward creates an uneasy and fractious relationship between democracy and imperialism. In short, the scramble for Africa is a good example to highlight the basic tensions between the notions of democracy and imperialism- that they are theoretically incompatible. The inclusion of almost 30% of Africa’s population under British rule without consultation (not even necessarily against their will) can be nothing but anti-democratic. Even though there is no universally accepted definition of 'democracy', there are two principles that any definition of democracy includes: the first being that all members of the society have equal access to power (at least theoretically) and the second that all members enjoy universally recognised freedoms and liberties. Furthermore, Aristotle’s democratic theory insists that ‘one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich, because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority is sovereign. This then is one mark of liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes to equalitarian liberty.’ In essence, therefore, his version of democracy is a complete contradiction of any notion of imperialistic expansion and exploitation, as shown in the scramble for Africa example. Aristotle’s view on democracy, albeit not the affirmative template for democratic practices, does encapsulate the very essence of what sets democracy, as government by the many, apart from autocratic and oligarchic rule. Therefore it can easily be seen that the notion of imperialism and democracy being compatible at all is already under threat and difficulties in trying to find both an imperialist and a democrat become even harder.
However, Joseph Chamberlain can be considered both an aspiring democrat and a hard line imperialist. Although a radical Liberal, his desire to spread the democratic ways of government coupled with his eagerness to protect British overseas interests meant he saw himself as both democrat and imperialist. However, he placed greater importance on reaching justice in the pursuit of such interests, rather than the rest of his Liberal cohorts who were generally anti-imperialist. In such a way, Joseph Chamberlain makes himself the perfect British example to examine just how democracy and imperialism can work in tandem.
As an imperialist, Chamberlain, offered the chance of high office in Salisbury’s 1895 administration, turned down the roles of Chancellor and Home Secretary, instead demanding the post of Colonial Secretary- a politically unimportant and non-influential job compared to what the Conservative leadership were prepared to offer him. As Fraser points out, Chamberlain felt himself able to apply the same vigour he had shown in forcing through his reform programme in Birmingham to the subject of the Empire, which he was passionate about. With heightened tensions among the European colonial powers in Africa and the popular support that imperialism enjoyed, Chamberlain saw the potential of using the post as a platform for global prominence- both because of its latent influence and his reliance upon his natural ability in his job and in the House. Chamberlain revelled in the chance to expand his beloved British Empire and the carte blanche that he had earned off Salisbury allowed him to restructure issues he felt needed attention with his own blueprint, such as the restructuring of imperial trade. Indeed, Chamberlain finally had the means to implement his dream- the reconstruction of the Empire into a paternalistic federal set up, with Britain the father-figure to the other offspring English-speaking colonies. Chamberlain had always been a staunch supporter of a stronger empire: in a speech in Toronto in 1897, he declared that ‘I should think our patriotism was warped and stunted indeed if it did not embrace the Greater Britain beyond the seas.’ Although an ‘imperial confederation’ had been bandied about before, it was Joseph Chamberlain’s imperialist tendencies that drove serious discussion about a proper system of colonial defence and imperial preference in tariffs: buoyed by Conservative support in forging the next evolution of the British Empire Chamberlain began his magnum opus. His task was a vast one- governing over ten million square miles of land and over 450 million people, but it was in the face of such daunting odds that Chamberlain’s attributes as a democrat are most pronounced. The tone that Chamberlain set from London was that positive government action could bring the empire's peoples closer to the crown. In fact, he stated himself that ‘I believe that the British race is the greatest of the governing races that the world has ever seen…It is not enough to occupy great spaces of the world's surface unless you can make the best of them. It is the duty of a landlord to develop his estate.’ Indeed, Chamberlain spent heavily in central and northern Africa and the West Indies to try and drag these underdeveloped areas into line with the rest of the Empire, and none more so than Western Africa. Chamberlain believed that West Africa was the key to making his African economic ‘project’ a success- and therefore sanctioned the annexation of the Ashanti in 1895, with Colonel Sir Francis Scott successfully occupying Kumasi and the territory of the Gold Coast. However, rather than simply occupying the new territory Chamberlain used the funds of Lagos and other colonies to build a new railway to connect the new lands into the Empire. Rather than the plain cynical and capitalist imperialism that the Conservatives were prone to, Chamberlain saw it as his responsibility to educate and civilize those beneath him. Indeed, Garvin goes as far to say that Chamberlain tried to breed a new form of imperialism- one that needed democracy simply to function. The social Darwinism that allowed Britain to ascend into the position of colonial master also created countries less fortunate than Britain, such as those in Western Africa and Chamberlain felt the need to teach those ‘barbarians’ how to be civilised. In other words, imperialism was tempered by democracy to help spread the benefits of Britain’s own democracy.
However, Chamberlain was not always so magnanimous. The Royal Niger Company’s possessions around the Niger were left vulnerable to envious French eyes. Indeed, the French sent small garrisons to the area with the intention of controlling it and when the chairman of the Royal Niger Company, Sir George Goldie, appealed for direct British action to support his flailing assets in the Niger, Chamberlain found himself in a perfect position to reinforce Britain’s influence in his favoured West Africa. Even though Salisbury wished to concentrate on securing the Nile, Chamberlain felt it his duty to act on behalf of ‘his’ people. Upon finding that the French had expanded from Dahomey to Bussa, Chamberlain feared further French growth in the region that would have cut Lagos off and thereby limiting its economic growth and ability to flourish. Chamberlain therefore argued that Britain should protect Niger even at the cost of war. Indeed, strong diplomatic action was backed up by Chamberlain’s blessing upon a military force, led by Frederick Lugard, to reoccupy those areas claimed by Britain that were under threat from the French. Even with the high risk of sparking a full scale colonial war, Chamberlain called the French bluff, who were forced to back down and cede Bussa in return for Bona. In summary, Chamberlain was prepared to go to war to defend his imperialist project and the democracy he was exercising there. Indeed, one can even go as far to say that Chamberlain’s support for the 1st Boer War was based upon the disenfranchisement of the minorities under the Transvaal and Orange Free State regimes, although such a noble cause looks paltry next to the economic and expansionist jealousy that such a wealthy state could create and the use of force looks more like an attempt to redress the economic balance, rather than a just war to right the wrongs of democracy in South Africa.
In conclusion, therefore, we are left under no illusion that Chamberlain was a staunch imperialist, by his overtly expansionist policies in Africa and by his pandering to popular support of empire building he made himself personally popular while doing a task that he fervently believed in. However, his novel method of injecting imperialist exploitation with democratic expansion, by supplying ‘his’ new citizens with the choice and freedom that democracy offers, utilising the military to ensure the rule of law, and fulfilling his duty to educate and civilize the lands under his control, he can also be labelled a democrat. Indeed, Chamberlain used democracy to help mould his imperial utopia, and used his imperialism to spread his democracy to ‘his’ people, to defend the rights of those whose rights were under threat and to keep people in Britain more interested in the colonies rather than let democracy at home slip into class warfare and anarchism.
As an interesting postscript, on the issue of Ireland we can see that Chamberlain was not quite as accommodating as with his beloved colonies: ‘I cannot admit that five millions of Irishmen have any greater right to govern themselves without regard to the rest of the United Kingdom than the five million inhabitants of the metropolis.’
On the other side of the Atlantic, there is a similar situation with Theodore Roosevelt, who can also be seen as democrat and imperialist. Harbouring rabidly expansionist dreams for America, casting his eyes over Latin and Central America that looked ripe for effective American projection of influence and power, Roosevelt was also a champion of democratic values both at home and abroad. Indeed, as Roosevelt resigned from his cushy job in the Navy Department in 1898 to take up arms against the Spanish, he put the notion of defending the American ‘empire’ before his political career. In fact, so passionate was he about defending the empire, he helped form the First US Volunteer Cavalry Regiment and later took up the leadership of the regiment as Colonel Roosevelt. Under his leadership, the ‘Rough Riders’, as his regiment was nicknamed, became famous for brave and audacious charges on Kettle and San Juan Hill on 1 July 1898, during the Spanish-American War. It is necessary to note at this point that in using the term ‘American Empire’, I refer to the limit of substantial American influence and direct control over territory- I see no reason to call the projection of US power onto overseas territories anything different than the British exercising power over their Imperial possessions. By helping to found a new regiment and then applying himself so fully to the task in the war in Cuba, there is no doubt over Roosevelt’s sincerity behind his support of imperialism. His presidency simply gave him the ability to let his ideas become tangible foreign policy. Roosevelt’s decision to continue the war against the Philippine resistance was an ominous warning that dissolution of the greater American ‘family’ was not acceptable under any circumstances. The idea of an independent Philippine nation was not tolerable to Roosevelt’s ideas of spreading, and maintaining, US global influence. Indeed, the actual declaration of hostilities against America issued by the ‘rebel’ leader Aguinaldo reads ‘I order and command:
1. That peace and friendly relations with the Americans be broken and that the latter be treated as enemies, within the limits prescribed by the laws of war.
2. That the Americans captured be held as prisoners of war.
3. That this proclamation be communicated to the consuls and that congress order and accord a suspension of the constitutional guarantee, resulting from the declaration of war.’ Such a strongly worded and blunt declaration of hatred against the Americans hit Roosevelt hard, as he felt that American influence was beneficial in fostering a country that had been under the boot of Spanish tyranny and was now under American incubation rather than the oppressive nature of rule that such a Filipino declaration insinuates. Indeed, such a notion that American presence could be at odds with Filipino democracy jarred with Roosevelt, but he seemed to placate himself by settling upon the line of argument that a US presence in the Philippines was better than any other nation’s, even if it seemed relatively undemocratic at present. However, the major illustration of his rampant expansionism was his role in securing US involvement in the Panama Canal project. Roosevelt saw the failing French attempts at forging a canal across Central America through Panama as the prefect opportunity to expand US influence and solidify American dominance in the region. Firstly, Roosevelt nullified the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which meant Britain conceded to the US building a Pacific-Atlantic canal. Indeed, not only did this agreement, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, give the US the ability to extend their influence it was also implicit recognition that the British could not maintain, let alone extend, their sphere of influence in Latin America. Roosevelt took great joy in revelling in the knowledge that even the world’s largest empire had to bow before American imperialism.
However, his motives for extending US authority over Panama were not only based in the economic. Panama was a province of Colombia and it had been Colombia that had first proposed the canal in Panama as opposed to their rival Nicaragua, and had acquired US support for its scheme. According to the 1902 treaty, America was to buy out the equipment and excavations from the failed French attempt and assume responsibility for completing the canal in return for control of its use. However, although the Colombian negotiating team had signed the treaty, the Columbian parliament refused to ratify it, demanding more money than the $40 million that the treaty first proposed. After America rebuffed this attempt to squeeze more out of them, the Colombians attempted to buy the French out themselves to regain control of a process that Roosevelt had set in motion and one that was slipping out of their control. Roosevelt was decidedly unimpressed and turned to democracy to give his next imperialistic actions an aura of credibility. In 1903, he decided that if he could not coerce the Colombians into compliance he would simply create a more malleable group to negotiate with- he threw his whole support behind the Panamanian separatist movement. The Republic of Panama was created with a pre-written constitution that was fashioned under US guidance and as soon as this was ratified by the Panamanians, Roosevelt signed a strong protection treaty with them. In effect, Roosevelt created a new regime and became its only method of survival, giving him the wriggle room to do what he wanted to- a facet he used to his advantage. The US paid only $10 million to gain the rights to build and control the Canal Zone and Roosevelt returned from his Panamanian outing the hero of imperialism and the defender of democracy.
However, in terms of being a democrat, Roosevelt was no less outlandish than his actions on the global stage. In Roosevelt’s own work The Winning of the West he claimed that the frontier was simply a struggle between the civilized Americans and the supposed savagery of the Indians. However, he does note that ‘American and Indian, Boer and Zulu, Cossack and Tartar, New Zealander and Maori, – in each case the victor, horrible though many of his deeds are, has laid deep the foundations for the future greatness of a mighty people.’ Indeed, the ‘for the good of the nation’ sentiments evident on his views on Indians was reflected in his policy on blacks as well. Roosevelt felt that the equality for the black race would come through progress from one generation to the next. Indeed, he continues that ‘the only wise and honorable [sic] and Christian thing to do is to treat each black man and each white man strictly on his merits as a man.’ Roosevelt’s acceptance of blacks into society was not only seen as outrageous, it was downright dangerous: he even spoke to an armed crowd to show his adulation for those blacks who fought with him on Cuba- ‘I hold that if a man is good enough to be put up and shot at then he is good enough for me to do what I can to get him a square deal.’ Therefore, it can be seen that Roosevelt was also a democrat in the sense of trying to enforce the equality of men that is a vital part of being a full and proper democracy.
Chamberlain and Roosevelt are both fascinating characters in history that stand out as being two of the most hard line imperialists of the modern age, but both were considered democrats as well- a paradox that should, by all accounts, not occur. By necessity, as Aristotle shows, the ability to be both an imperialist and a true democrat is seemingly impossible- the rights of men, as promised in a democracy, simply is not compatible with the notion of expanding the influence of one nation over another without consideration for the people of those lands. Having said this, the examples of Theodore Roosevelt and Joseph Chamberlain beg to differ- both achieving acclaim as imperialists and democrats. However, the conclusion that Chamberlain and Roosevelt show that imperialism and democracy are compatible is simply incorrect, and as such four main points can be concluded. Firstly, both Chamberlain and Roosevelt were imperialists first and foremost. The consolidation of British power in Africa and the reinforcement of American power in the Philippines as well as expansion into Latin America were pursued simply along the lines of expansionist imperialist policies that were engaged upon to fortify the existing assets and expand their respective empires. Secondly, Chamberlain and Roosevelt were imperialists that either used democracy as an excuse or as a useful political ruse to provide a shadow of respectability to an exploitative and cynical expansion of interests. The political persecution of the minorities under the Transvaal government provided the pretext that Chamberlain required to undermine the economic edge that the Transvaal and Orange Free State regimes possessed, and manoeuvring Britain into the position to reap the rewards of such a shift in the balance of power in the cape. Roosevelt used the Colombian disarray over the financial implications of American help to wrest crucial territory off them to secure American interests in the area, and while doing so created a regime that, having had a constitution forced onto it by America, was considered a step towards democracy. Thirdly, both Roosevelt and Chamberlain cannot wholly be considered ‘democrats’ (as in one who is a supporter of full participatory democracy and all its benefits for all its citizens). Indeed, both felt that a restrictive franchise was a necessity- even though both wanted to see an extension of said franchise; neither wanted it to be a fully open and therefore dangerous electorate. Having said that, both were considered enlightened in terms of ‘democracy’ for the times, and for that reason it is possible to claim to say that they were, comparatively, democrats. Even so, the unequal application of even their limited vision of ‘democracy’ provides damning evidence that their imperialism could not be hauled back by their democratic tendencies. The viciousness with which Roosevelt condemns expanding any kind of rights to the Native Americans reveals an autocratic and fundamentally racist side that simply cannot sit comfortably with the notion of being a democrat. Similarly, Chamberlain’s refusal to even contemplate the Irish for self-government, coupled with his love for extending the rights of citizens living in a ‘democratic empire’ is plain hypocrisy that belies his claim to be a true democrat. Indeed, it is interesting to note that both men were happy with this unequal application of democracy- and both were willing to concede to resolutions to issues overseas in the pursuit of imperial aims that were categorically denied to minorities at home: Roosevelt to the Indians and Chamberlain to the Irish. Finally, and most importantly, it is clear to see that Aristotle’s blueprint for a true democracy cannot be compatible with imperialism- the two are fundamentally not suited to be pursued in parallel. Roosevelt and Chamberlain are merely men that were more democratic in their outlook than other rabid imperialists, and both cynically manipulated the term democracy to use for their own ends and cast the shroud of ‘civilizing’ over the exploitation that their imperialistic tendencies required of them. In conclusion, then, democracy was never compatible with imperialism- Roosevelt and Chamberlain, although showing they can incorporate it into their expansionist policies at times, did so for the wrong reasons and were never really concerned with the notion of democracy in comparison to their life-long passion with imperial glory.